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Abstract
A/-Jazeera is unique in the Arab world. In an environment of
state-controlled or stale media, this Arab-language news chan-
nel sees itself as a source offresh water in a parched region
bereft offreedom ofexpression. It broadcasts controversial sub-
jects and, in doing so, has attracted an audience of 35 million
households ~ and plenty ofcriticism. Most notable controversies
have been the airing of tapes of Osama bin Laden. and the
broadcasting of images of captured Coalition soldiers and
bloodied corpses during the Iraq war. Before those events, AI-
Jazeera had criticisedArab heads ofstate, blatantly ignoring the
Arab States Broadcasting Union scode ofhonour. Some compa-
nies have avoided the channel because advertising in the Middle
East is based on political, not commercial, interests. Yet along
the way, AI-Jazeera has put Qatar. a tiny Gulfnation ofperhaps
600,000 people, on the world map. Based on the last-known
interviews before the station went on a war footing, this paper
looks at why and how AI-Jazeera does what it does. Among the
things covered are how the station defines freedom ofexpression
through its own eyes. the role that the station and its employees
believe they are serving in the marketplace. and why they do
what they do. The paper also considers the station s role in the
war in Iraq in March and April of2003.
Introduction
"AI-lazeera is a drop of fresh water that was dropped into a pool of stale
water that stood still for decades," says lihad Ali Bailout, who is responsible for
media relations at the channel. "AI-lazeera has created ripples that refreshed the
water. The more the water moves the fresher it gets, until such a time that we
have really fresh water for the audience to take from." (Bailout, 2003)
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In the Arab world of state-controlled and stale media, AI-lazeera has indeed
caused ripples. The statr of the satellite-delivered television channel regard
those ripples as creating a "revolution" in the Arab world. Bailout, in particu-
lar, views AI-Jazeera as a major force in developing freedom of expression and
liberalising the marketplace of ideas in the Arab world. Travelling this pathway
has not been easy because laws and custom sometimes have made covering sto-
ries difficult. A raft of privacy laws, plus custom and respect for authority, make
covering certain subjects either uncomfortable or off limits. Timeliness is
sometimes a problem as well. Mohammed lasim AI-Ali, the channel's director-
general, has noted that a host of agreements between Arab television stations
has obliged them not to broadcast any report before transmission by official
news agencies. Practically speaking, this has meant waiting several hours
before broadcasting a report.
"'Arab infonnation mentality must change and develop, and not remain as
it was many years ago," AI-Ali said (AI-Farah, 2003). AI-Ali and his staff want
Arab audiences to return to trusting the Arab media, especially the news. "You
should bring them the truth, not false information, or they won't watch. We
treat them as an intelligent audience, rather than the conventional idea that
they'll take whatever you give them." (AI-Ali quoted in Schleifer, 2000) AI-Ali
has said the broadcaster was a demonstration of faith in the message of free-
dom. "When the channel became operational, everyone wanted to silence this
free voice," he told AI-Dustur, lordan's leading establishment daily (AI-Farah,
2003). The Middle East media have a reputation for being censored and con-
trolled. "All media business in the Middle East is controlled by the government.
The leaders of Qatar wanted to change that; they wanted to have a satellite
channel with the aim of no longer hiding any information," AI-Ali said
(Schleifer, 2000).
AI-lazeera has not hidden anything, becoming an equal opportunity offend-
er while irritating almost every government in the region and many outside the
Gulf. At one time or another, governments from Algeria to Yemen have lodged
complaints against the station. Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya have all recalled
their ambassadors from Doha in protest at AI-lazeera coverage, reinstating
them once their point was made. Dr Faisal AI-Qassem, who presents the high-
rated but controversial The Opposite Direction, said Egyptian police once
dragged his brother - a pop star - out of his home in his pyjamas and bundled
him on a plane to Jordan as a warning to the presenter. "In Algiers," Qassem
said, "they cut off the electricity supply so that people could not watch the pro-
gram because we were talking about the military generals and how they are
wasting the money of Algerians." (quoted in Whitaker, 2003, p. I) Egypt's
state-owned media ran a campaign against AI·Jazeera's programs, describing
the station as a '''sinister salad of sex, religion and politics" topped with "sensa-
tionalist seasoning", Yasir Arafat was reportedly incensed by AI-lazeera's fre-
quent interviews with the Hamas spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. The
network upset Palestinian authorities with a preview of a March 200 I docu-
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mentary that explored the role of Palestinian guerillas in the 1975-90 civil war
in Lebanon. Jordan temporarily closed AI-Jazeera's bureau in the capital,
Amman. after a guest on a debate program criticised the government.
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa AI-Thani. chairman of the board of AI-Jazeera,
recalls that when AI-Jazeera covered events in Iraq, it was accused of being a
channel financed by Iraq or Saddam Hussein.
... When we reported on the Israeli elections and when we ran
interviews with Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres, AI-Jazeera was
immediately accused of being financed by the Mossad [Israel's
secret police]. ... When we reported on events or issues within
the United States from our office in Washington we were
accused of being financed by the CIA. (quoted in Transcript of
interview with Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer AI-Thani, 200 I)
According to the channel, some Arab viewers have even accused it of pro-
moting US propaganda when it puts American officials or statements on air. AI-
Jazeera broadcasts all White House, Pentagon and State Department press
briefings from Washington (Campagna, 2001).
Broadcasts of videotapes featuring Osama bin Laden have generated the
most fame and notoriety for the channel. AI-Jazeera's long 1998 interview with
bin Laden, which it re-broadcast with English subtitles not long after the
September 11,200[, attacks on the United States, brought the channel praise
and condemnation in almost equal measure. In an editorial on October 14,
200 I, the New York Daily News described AI-Jazeera as "one of the most
potent weapons in the [slamic Axis arsenal". The newspaper then opined,
almost hysterically: "It is an Arab propaganda outfit controlled by the medieval
government of Qatar that masquerades as a real media company. For years, it
has inflamed the Arab world against the United States and its allies." The news-
paper concluded that dealing with the station was "a job for the military".
"Shutting it down should be an immediate priority because, left alone, it has the
power to poison the air more efficiently and lethally than anthrax ever could."
(AI-Jazeera unmasked: An Arab propaganda machine in the guise of real jour-
nalism, 200 I)
During a meeting in Muscat, the Omani capital, in October 2002, the min-
isters of information in all six Gulf Co-operation Council states recommended
thatAI-Jazeera be banned in their countries because the station's news and pro-
grams "offend the whole Gulf region" (Staff reporter, 2002, p. I). The United
Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman subsequently decided to allow the
channel to stay. Saudi Arabia forbids AI-Jazeera staff from entering its territo-
ry, and in 2003 extended the ban to special events such as the hajj, the annual
pilgrimage to Mecca. AI-Ali was phi[osophical about these bans, suggesting
that satellite technology allowed them a virtual form of entry. He said:
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True, we do not exist in Bahrain. but we do cover events there.
The same can also be said about Kuwait and other places,
regardless of whether we have a presence there or not. We have
been covering events without any problem. No one can say that
they can boycott AI-Jazeera, because that is very difficult. (AI-
Farah,2003)
Others inside the station agreed with this assessment. 8a11out said the cov-
erage of events
ran against the grain of several Arab states to say the least, and
the reverberations of which we can still feel, with the refusal to
let us work in several states. We only have two bureaus, onc in
the UAE and one in Oman. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and
Bahrain have a problem with the way we do our business. So
yes, it has caused us some problems, but it goes with the terri-
tory. I think if everyone was happy with us we won't be doing
our job.
Since 2001, various Western government leaders have visited Qatar's emir,
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa AI-Thani. to ask him to restrain the station. The US
embassy in Qatar filed a formal diplomatic complaint with local authorities
regarding Al-Jazeera's coverage. Bush administration officials made it clear
that they were upset by what they viewed as AI-Jazeera's "unbalanced and anti-
American" coverage. And in the aftermath of September 11, many Washington
officials refused to appear on the channel despite numerous requests from Al-
Jazeera's Washington bureau (Sullivan, 2000).
But AI-Jazeera has its defenders too. Organisations like the Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Journalists sans Frontieres have lodged com-
plaints about the aggressive statements coming out of the United States. "Arab
government attempts to influence AI-Jazeera have garnered widespread atten-
tion over the years. We are disheartened to see US officials adopting similar
tactics," said CPJ executive director Ann Cooper (quoted in Sullivan, 2000).
Former CNN correspondent Peter Arnelt rhetorically asked: "What about the
US right-wing press that's been [bashing] Arabs? Do they rein them in? Do
they rein in Fox TV? Are we going to order our own media to rein in its cover-
age? It's getting out of hand."
Aside from the press freedom implications, CPJ Middle East coordinator
Joel Campagna noted, US calls for Qatar to censor AI-Jazeera may have back-
fired by generating criticism from the Arab world at a time when the United
States needed the support of people in the region. "I think this elevates AI-
Jazeera into an even more powerful organisation than it is," agreed Arnett.
'''Simply, it's a news source that's threatening the US. They don't have any
guns. They haven't been traced to bin Laden." (quoted in Campagna, 2001)
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Some critics of AI·Jazeera have maintained that the station is willing to crit-
icise Arab governments in the region, but will not challenge Qatar's rulers. New
York Times columnist Thomas Friedman argues that Al-Jazeera sometimes
"goes easy" on the Doha government. "To be sure, Al-Jazeera goes easier on
Qatar than it does on Saudi Arabia, but it has actually aired charges of torture
in Qatar." (Friedman. 2001) The CPJ argues that the station has generally been
well regarded for its editorial independence, despite being funded by the emir
ofQatar until November 2001. "Nevertheless, it has been taken to task for usu-
ally avoiding tough scrutiny ofQatari affairs and any strong criticism of the rul-
ing AI-Thani family." (Campagna, 200 I) Local Qatari families sometimes won-
der the same thing (Interview with author (anonymity requested), 2002).
More seasoned thinkers believe that muzzling Al-Jazeera would be a case
of shooting the messenger. Yosri Fouda, head of AI-Jazeera's London bureau,
asked rhetorically: "Ifbin Laden is going to send a tape, who will he send it to?
To CNN, who he probably considers a representative of 'the enemy'? No. To
an Arab government channel? No, because there's just as much animosity
there." Al-Jazeera was relaying valuable information that the West did not have,
Fouda said, and it would continue doing so "for as long as everything is veri-
fied and as long as time and space are given for different viewpoints" (Sullivan,
200 I). Journalists in the Arab world also see United States policy as hypocriti-
cal for pressuring AI-Jazeera to modify its coverage, given the American view
of itself as a symbol of freedom and democracy. Daoud Kuttab, director of the
Institute of Modem Media at AI-Quds University on the West Bank and an
observer of Arab regional media, believes AI-Jazeera's work has been profes-
sional and balanced. "As to the Americans, they are completely wrong and
apply a double standard. I can see why they are angry but it is not because AI-
Jazeera is not fair. On the contrary, I think they wish for AI-Jazeera to be biased
to the US." (quoted in Campagna, 2001).
Al-Jazeera's creators appreciated early on the power of media technologies,
particularly satellites and more recently the Internet, to enter Arabian homes
and tell compelling stories. "You could once control the information before
there was Internet, before there was satellite," noted AI-AIi. "People got much
of their information from government sources. '" When satellite channels start.
cd, it was no longer possible to hide the sources of information from the view.
ing audience. This is the atmosphere in which AI-Jazeera started." (quoted in
Schleifer, 2000) Many countries have managed to block the BBC terrestrial
services, but they cannot block satellite channels or the Internet, AI-Ali said. "If
something is on a Western channel, it has a limited effect. But AI-Jazeera
affects a much larger audience, because it's in Arabic." (quoted in Schleifer,
2000)
The barriers that prevented dissemination of information to Arab citizens
have been torn down because of developments in information technology and
telecommunications worldwide, AI-Ali said. "The Arab infoffilation ministries
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can no longer control infonnation. No one can control infonnation." In the 21 st
century, the news business had changed but the news mentality in many Arab
states had not. "And, if there has been a change, it is very modest and has not
caught up with the rapid change in the technology and information sectors
worldwide." (quoted in AI-Farah, 2003)
Others who work at the station agree with this assessment. Bailout says:
AI-lazeera has managed to push a crack in the dogma of media
in the Arab world. I think we have the lead and people now are
following. AI-lazeera has blasted the censors. The rest are step-
ping, a step at a time, towards perhaps how media should be
practiced professionally, with lesser ... censorship, lesser con-
trol, lesser influence of whatever powers that be.
For his part, Bailout is happy to see that Arab media have moved towards
the type of service that the Arab public deserves. "For decades," he said, "the
Arab public has been treated by the media as simply a pot where news is cho-
sen, disinfected, doctored and thrown in." And the public had to accept it. The
difference today is that the public can now see news "'as raw,as it is". Bailout
says:
We are proud to say that this is what AI-lazeera has started.
Someone has said that AI-lazeera has started a revolution in
media, and I think this statement is borne out because so many
media are ... trying to base their ethos along the lines that AI-
Jazeera has come out openly with.
AI-lazeera received much criticism during the Iraq war in March-April
2003 because it broadcast footage of the dead and bloodied bodies of Coalition
soldiers. It also showed images of maimed and dead civilians, especially chil-
dren. Much of this footage was gory and bloody. The channel responded to this
criticism by saying it had a duty to show the world casualties on all sides in the
Iraq war. "War has victims from both sides," said AI-Jazeera's editor in chief,
Ibrahim Hilal. "If you don't show both sides, you are not covering the war." (El
Deeb, 2003) A former BBC Middle East correspondent and an expert on the
region's media, Tim L1ewelyn, said AI-lazeera was doing what the BBC had
taught it to do. It was providing coverage of the war from another perspective.
Many AI-lazeera journalists were "products of the BBC" because they had
worked for the corporation's Arabic service before joining the channel,
L1ewelyn said. "The Arab media is used to it [criticism from the West] and they
talk about double standards. What they are doing is showing the war from a dif-
ferent perspective while we show it from a British perspective." (Deans, 2003)
Nicola Baldwin, a freelance journalist working for the Middle Eastern
Broadcasting Corporation in Dubai, said there was also a cultural element to
the debate. Middle East television had much less of a taboo about showing
close-ups of dead bodies. "TV stations in the Middle East have always shown
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pictures of [dead] bodies. They don't have the same restrictions - it's normal
for them. They will show pictures of dead Palcstinians and [sraelis, for
instance." (Baldwin, 2003). [t should be noted thatAI-Jazeera removed images
of bloodied Coalition soldicrs until the soldiers' families had been notified,
after the Pentagon asked it to do so (New York Times, 2003). Television stations
in numerous other countries continued to show them.
AI-Jazeera has made television news topical in the Arab world, through a
combination of professionalism and controversy. Before AI-Jazeera went on the
air in November 1996, Arab stations ignored news, concentrating on entertain-
ment. That has changed. And more changes are afoot. Viewers were turned off
because the media gave the official side. whereas AI-Jazeera was different
because it stuck to "the viewers' side, which is the most important" (AI-Farah,
2003). AI-Jazeera gives more than the official view, deliberately offering opin-
ions from different viewpoints. This policy is reflected in the station's motto,
emblazoned in Arabic on its publicity brochure: "al-ra'i ... wal ra'i al-akhr". In
English it means "'opinion ... and the other opinion". This is reflected in the
titles of its talk programs - The Opposite Direction, More Than One Opinion
and No Frontiers - which screen about 9.30 most evenings. Its news programs
offer breadth and depth of content, with bulletins at the top of the hour plus a
full hour at dawn, early morning, midday and late evening. The channel boasts
two flagship investigative programs that screen after the evening talk shows
about IOpm. All station timings are based on Saudi Arabian time, which is three
hours ahead of GMT.
From Bailout's perspective, the origins of this varied programming are sim-
ple. "To gel all this together, to come up with a good product," he said, "you
need a constant measure of freedom, for your journalists to express themselves
through. And here we have the acid test."
AI-Jazeera ... has taken the element of freedom and transparen-
cy to extremes - perhaps, some people say.... We believe we
can still go further than that. It's just a matter of if the others can
create for themselves a playing field the boundaries of which
are wide enough for them to express themselves satisfactorily,
to be happy with themselves in the first place as journalists and
then to satisfy the audience that [we] have spoiled for all intents
and purposes by getting them used to news that has been unedit-
ed, uncensored and to a very considerable extent balanced.
He said that if that news was imperfect, that "is just because of the way peo-
ple are".
Ajournalist is a human being at the end of the day. He's got his
loves, his likes, his hates. So perhaps it is very difficult for a
journalist, like any other person, to be fair, because fairness is a
matter of the heart and the spirit. [ would not claim that any of
my colleagues have attained a spiritual clarity.
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What should happen, he thinks, is that a journalist should create a level
playing field by being balanced. "If a journalist can manage to do that ... he
would be going a long way towards doing his job," said Bailout. This search
for balance is the way in which AI-Jazeera sees itself as revolutionary.
Some commentators think the station may have gone too far, complaining
that it deliberately courts controversy. Some believe that the "raw, as it is"
method of presenting leads to the "if it bleeds, it leads" mentality prevalent in
local news in the United States. Others believe that AI-Jazeera's choice of con-
tent reflects the Arab perspective on world events. telling the truth through
Arabic eyes. That means the war in Iraq is being presented through the eyes of
average Iraqis, not through the eyes of Coalition soldiers. This is very much a
different perspective. Or Lena Jayyusi, a Palestinian media commentator,
applauds AI-Jazeera's news for its depth, breadth and analysis.
[ was in Paris when the war against Iraq started. [had access
to CNN and BBC there around the clock. But, despite the pleas
and warnings of friends and relatives about flying back to the
Gulf, and questions about whether I was worried or fearful
about doing so whilst the war was taking place, I could not wait
to get back, just so [ could follow the war through the coverage
of AI-Jazeera. Literally. [ knew I would not get one-sided prop-
aganda on this issue, and [ would get to see really what was
going on at ground zero. This has indeed been tbe case, at a
time when networks like the BBC and CNN sanitise the images
and reports they air. This reaction is pretty well general in the
Arab world. (Jayyusi 2003)
Dr Badran Badran, another Palestinian media commentator who is an avid
AI-Jazeera viewer, believes the station leads in the area of freedom of expres-
sion. "Arabs appreciate a station that covers all major events very well and is
not afraid to tell the truth," he said. "[ appreciate the station's coverage of inter-
and intra-Arab issues in a transparent and open manner. 1 also admire the sta-
tion's echoing of Arab voices against what they perceive to be an ineffective
and dysfunctional Arab body politic." Dr Badran said he appreciated AI-
Jazeera's commitment to be balanced and objective. "[But] [ do not appreciate
the lack of intellectualism in some of its talk shows which smell of political agi-
tation without a real agenda." (Badran, 2003)
Bailout counters that this lack of an agenda has its own value:
I think that our raison d'etre is the ... other opinion.... I believe
without freedom of expression, a human being is missing.
Without a human being being able to express himself, in a
responsible way, without being told "this is a taboo, don't
touch" - in other words you are telling him not to think.
Ultimately people will become stale. If they can't express, why
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should they think. Or they would think and bottle it up until
such a day that they would explode. It's not only that we belicve
in freedom of expression, we practice it.
Beyond attracting an audience, Bailout believes that freedom of expression
ultimately will profoundly impact the entire Arab world. He said:
I was discussing the issue of freedom of expression and democ-
racy with a senior colleague the other day. My colleague said
that AI-Jazeera will have another role, and that's leading with
freedom of expression towards democratising the community
and Arab society. This idea made sense to me. I have reached
the stage where [have started thinking [that] freedom ofexpres-
sion and democracy are one and the same, and there is hardly
any difference. Because to be able to practice democracy you
have to have freedom of expression, and to have freedom of
expression you have to have democracy. So perhaps there is a
fine line that separates freedom of expression and democracy.
So in essence, for you Americans, we are practising democracy
in Qatar.
This wasn't always the case in Qatar. In 1995, Sheik Hamad, then crown
prince of Qatar, overthrew his father - on holiday in Europe - in a bloodless
coup. Analysts say the crown prince was impatient with his father's reluctance
to release funds for investment. The new emir and his foreign minister, Sheikh
Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr AI-Thani, promptly announced a new order and set
out to challenge Saudi primacy in the Gulf region. They hoped AI-Jazeera
would demonstrate the country's independence and give the small kingdom a
voice in the world (Curtiss, 1998). Sheik Hamad founded AI-Jazeera by decree
in February 1996 and it started broadcasting on November I of that year. Initial
funding of somewhere between $137 and $140 million was provided on the
understanding that the station would be self-sustaining within five years of
debut. The station operated for six hours a day initially, quickly moved to 12,
and on January I, 1999, it started broadcasting around the clock (Zednik,
2002).
The emir, Sheik Hamad, abolished the position of minister of infonnation
in 1998, a radical move given that every Arab nation has a ministry of infonna-
tion or culture whose role is to control and regulate the media. Sheikh Hamad
bin Thamer AI-Thani is chainnan of the board of AI-Jazeera and a member of
the Qatari royal family. He noted that the ministry of infonnation in Arab coun-
tries is designed to control the news media. "We looked to the Western world
which has very advanced media, and found that there are no ministries of infor-
mation. We don't see that a ministry of information has any positive role to play
in future media projects." (quoted in Transcript of interview with Sheikh
Hamad bin Thamer AI-Thani, 200 I)
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Audience data are not easily available in the Arab world, but the generally
agreed figure is that about 20 million households watch AI-lazeera regularly-
a huge audience, given the large number of people in extended Middle East
households. Most households receive it via satellite. Dishes are almost ubiqui-
tous in the Arab world - tens of millions of Arab families own them - and cost
less than $100. "They are as common in Cairo slums as they are in Dubai man-
sions. AI-lazeera beams its signal free of charge to most countries." Outside the
Arab world, in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, AI-
lazeera is usually offered as part of a subscription package (Ajami, 200 I).
Managing director AI-Ali attributes the station's success to three factors.
First is the financial means. which, if available, would ensure
the technical resources, which are equally important. Second is
the existence of a specialised, good working team, which is
under constant training. Third and most important is the avail-
ability of a margin of freedom. (AI-Farah, 2003)
AI-lazeera has earned a reputation that inspires love and hate in almost
equal measures (Whitaker, 2003, p. I). Until AI-lazeera arrived, Arab viewers
rarely recognised newscasters, though the people who introduced variety pro-
grams were well known. AI-Ali noted that in the past few years, presenters and
newscasters have become famous - "like film stars" - because of their expo-
sure on the channel.
For a station with such a large reach and loud voice, AI-Jazeera is located
in a small building with a tiny newsroom and - by Western standards - a minus-
cule staff. The palm trees, satellite dishes and transmission masts outside dwarf
the headquarters building in Qatar's capital, Doha. Egyptian president Hosni
Mubarak, touring the building in 2000, is said to have exclaimed: "This match-
box. All this noise is coming out of this matchbox." (quoted in Friedman, 200 I;
Zednik, 2002) The main newsroom, with about 70 workstations, measures 40m
in each direction. AI-lazeera has 755 employees worldwide, compared with
CNN's 4000. Only 75 journalists work in the Doha newsroom, said Bailout,
who is one of three people authorised to give media interviews (Bailout, 2003).
The others are managing director AI-Ali and chairman Sheik Hamad. Reporter
Rick Zednik, who spent 12 days in Qatar in late 200 I, described the journalists
in the newsroom as a loose, sociable bunch, representing almost all 22 mem-
bers of the Arab League. "Moroccan producers, Syrian talk show hosts, Iraqi
translators, Algerian fixers, Sudanese librarians, Palestinian secretaries, and
Qatari executives all speak together in Arabic." (Zednik, 2002) No one nation-
ality dominates, though almost all are Muslims. The newsroom is a secular
place, but a tiny mosque sits behind the main building. lournalists are united
through their language and religion, though not necessarily their politics. AI-
AIi believes this gives his station an edge over rivals in the region. "In Iraq we
know the language," AI-Ali has said. "We know the mentality. It's very easy for
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us to find out things and move around there." (quoted in Whitaker, 2003, p. I)
The journalists come lrom many different backgrounds, AI-Ali said. "There are
communists. secularists and Islamists. But they produce professional work in
the end." (AI-Farah, 2003)
Dirna Khatib has worked as a reporter and producer for AI-Jazeera since
1997. A Syrian, she initially worked for Swiss Radio International in Bern. On
the evening we interviewed her, it was her day off and she had already spent
seven hours at the station, and was about to return to translate Spanish Prime
Minister lose Maria Aznar's broadcast from the Azores. Khatib speaks seven
languages fluently and loves working at the channel. When she started it "felt
like home" because it gave her a chance to "put all her experiences together" in
an Arab context. "There is no typical day in my life, actually. This would be the
hardest question for me to answer." Working for AI-Jazeera gave her huge
opportunities for travel, and to show the world that many of their perceptions
of Arab women were stereotypes (Khatib, 2003).
At-Ali maintains that his journalists' style is more similar to the BBC than
CNN: "We are etoser to the ideas and the rhythm of the reports of the BBC."
Chief editor lbrahim Helal said AI-lazeera was set up about the same time that
the Orbit-funded BBC Arabic TV service was closed down. AI-lazeera brought
17 former BBC staff to Doha to help build the channel. "We built AI-Jazeera up
on the Western experience we had," said Helal, who moved from London to
Qatar.
From day one most of our editorial staff were from this BBC
environment - assignment editors, interview producers, news-
gathering editors, even picture editors. ... even after five years
if we're in doubt in a certain situation, we convene and ask our-
selves, if we were in London now what would we do? (Sullivan,
2001)
AI-Jazeera's staff are Arabs but most have had experience working with
Western media - "they're ex-BBC, ex-US media - but alt are Arabs",
Reporters gained professional experience from the BBC, but their back-
ground as Arabs meant they adapted this experience to the Arab world. "We
know the mentality of the Arabs - but we also want the expatriate Arab audi-
ence, who are used to Western media." AI-Jazeera had worked hard to create a
"culture of television journalism" in the newsroom, Helal said (quoted in
Schleifer, 2000). In an interview with Transnational Broadcasting Studies. AI-
Ali pointed out that chairman Sheikh Hamad had worked as a journalist for 14
years and "thinks like a journalist" - implying he appreciated freedom of
expression. "He's got good experience in the media. He's a graduate in com-
munications from Qatar University; he's got 14 years ofexperience in the field.
He thinks as a journalist, and that helps us a lot. He knows what we want exact-
ly." (Schleifer, 2000). Asia Times magazine, based in Hong Kong, said Qatari
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officials likened their relationship with the channel to that which the British
Broadcasting Corporation enjoyed with the British Government, but added a
codicil: "It is a well-known fact that Qatari foreign minister Sheikh Hamad bin
lassim bin labr AI-Thani owns 35 per cent of the channel and is a cousin of the
Qatari emir." (lanardhan, 2002)
AI-lazeera is not a member of the Arab States Broadcasting Union. The
channel initially applied for membership, but the union rejected it, claiming
that AI-lazeera failed to respect the union's code of honour, which includes not
broadcasting material critical of any Arab head of state. AI-Ali admitted the
channel had tried to join in the beginning. "We would be an addition to them as
much as they could be a support to us. We are not losing anything by not being
part, though; there's no advantage for us." (quoted in Schleifer, 2000) By 2003,
the channel was seeing its non-membership as a badge of honour, an indication
that it was not part of the broadcasting establishment.
AI-lazeera's chairman, Sheik Hamad, has maintained that the channel is
going in the same direction as the state of Qatar. He cited elections for a cham-
ber of commerce, plans for parliamentary elections and municipal elections
with women's participation - as candidates and voters - as recent examples of
modernisation. Qatar was the first Gulf nation to hold elections for municipal
positions:
I think this direction corresponds with the direction of the
media, be it AI-lazeera or lifting censorship on local Qatari
newspapers. The two go together in this stage, and [ think the
direction of AI-Jazeera is a natural one that corresponds with
the strategy Qatar is taking. (Transcript of interview with
Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer AI-Thani, 200 I)
[fimitation is a form of flattery, thenAI-lazeera should be flattered. Several
broadcasters are looking at re-creating its fonnula. Abu Dhabi Television, the
flagship of Emirates Media Incorporated, has an extensive news operation that
gained much attention from Arab viewers because of its coverage of the intifa-
da violence from September 2001. It set up a bureau in a prime location in cen-
tral Baghdad several months before the Iraq war started. The station distributed
$16 million worth of backpack video equipment with satellite uplinks to peo-
ple on the ground in Iraq. Many of these people were not trained as reporters,
but they managed to get some impressive footage. These strategic moves
enabled the channel to provide superior coverage of the war, especially after
Iraq evicted CNN's four journalists within days of the war starting (Personal
communication (anonymity requested), 2003).
Late in 2002, the Saudi-owned Middle East Broadcasting Centre, with
headquarters in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, announced the formation
of AI-Arabiya, intended to be a 24-hour news channel. It launched on February
20,2003, initially broadcasting for 12 hours a day. It sees AI-lazeera as its main
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competition, Salah Negm, head of news at MBC, worked for AI-lazeera from
July 1996 until September 200 I. Negm said journalists with TV experience at
an international level were rare in the Arab world. "The industry is not yet
mature and the training in most of the mass communication schools is not up to
the required standards," he said, The $300 million investment in AI-Arabiya is
said to come from private Saudi, Kuwaiti and Lebanese businessmen, but the
Saudi Government, through parent company MBC, will be able to exercise
influence (Khalaf, 2003), Within weeks of the Iraq war ending, AI-Arabiya was
the highest-rating news channel in the Gulf (Baldwin, 2003),
In Beirut, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation and London-based news-
paper AI-Hayat spent $24 million a year on a joint venture in which the news-
paper's 69 correspondents supply news for LBC International's three half-hour
bulletins each day, Jihad Khazen, AI-Hayat's founding editor-in-chief, and
LBC!'s managing editor, Salameh Nemett, said if the venture succeeded anoth-
er 24-hour news channel could emerge, Saudi money is also behind this part-
nership (Khalaf, 2003),
For his part, Bailout is not worried. "If imitation is any indication of respect,
then AI-Jazeera is doing well," he notes, "This little bit of competition is always
healthy," One key issue in the drive for editorial independence will be revenue
streams for all stations, Despite the fact that AI-Jazeera has the most popular
news and is the second most-watched pan-Arab station, it generated only about
$130 million in advertising revenue in 2002, By contrast, the Lebanese
Broadcasting Company - the region's most-watched network - attracted about
$186 million, MBC generated almost $600 million; and LBCSAT generated
about $132 million (Pan Arab Research Centre, 2003), Most Arab stations earn
about 90 per cent of their revenue from advertising. But commercials account
for only 40 per cent of Al-Jazeera's revenues. The rest comes from renting
equipment, cable subscription fees, and selling programs and videotapes,
Three-minute sections of bin Laden footage have reportedly fetched as much as
$500,000 apiece, As of early 2002, the station operated without government
subsidies (Zednik, 2002),
Yet this is not the same as paying for itself. Seven years after launching and
16 months after it was cut loose from the emir's financial umbilical cord - and
despite a huge audience of about 20 million households - AI-Jazeera was not
making money as of early 2003, "We have not yet reached the profit-making
phase," said AI-AIi in lanuary 2003, "In fact, we are still trying to break even
by covering our expenses from our work as much as possible and by diversify-
ing the sources of income," (AI-Farah, 2003) The sale of footage from the'
Afghan conflict to other television channels has boosted revenue, as should
footage from the Iraq war,
Meanwhile, some major advertisers operate an undeclared boycott, AI-Ali
admitted, "Advertising in the Middle East is not based on the commercial, it is
based on the political," he said, though he declined to give more details, Others
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blame Saudi influence and moves by the Gulf Co-operation Council against the
channel (Whitaker. 2003. p. 2). In an interview early in 2000. Al-Ali said the
channel needed to change the mentality of the businessman in the region.
Usually when you have a large audience, all the advertising
companies come to you. Here, all the advertising businesses are
impacted by political considerations; they think about the polit-
ical side rather than business side. I think this will change. just
like the freedom of the press has changed on the editorial side.
(quoted in Schleifer, 2000)
Regional and multinational companies tend to avoid rurning the feathers of
host governments, so they also have not bought advertising. AI-Ali admitted
that Saudi Arabian companies had tried to influence Al-Jazeem's coverage by
cutting advertising budgets for the station or threatening to do so. The tactic had
had no effect, he said. "We would lose our credibility with the audience."
Pepsico and General Electric cancelled advertising campaigns worth a com-
bined $6 million in 200 I, AI-Ali said (Zcdnik, 2002). Some marketing people
have suggested taking advantage of the AI-Jazeera bmnd, probably one of the
most valuable in the Middle East. A tobacco company wanted to use the chan-
nel to sell AI-Jazeem cigarettes, but that idea was dropped. Branded sunglass-
es might be a safer option, marketing staff suggested (Whitaker, 2003, p. 2).
AI-Jazeera still has big plans, despite cash shortfalls. On March 16, 2003 it
announced that an English-language Website would launch that month, two
years after launch ofaljazeem.net. The new site debuted 10 days later, presum-
ably hastened by the need to cover the Iraq war (see
http://english.aljazeem.net),buthackersbroughtitdownwithindays.AI-
Jazeem also announced it would be broadcasting in English early in 2004. It
remains to be seen whether the latter occurs; because other broadcast plans
announced years earlier have failed to materialise. Late in 2001, AI-Ali
announced plans to launch new Arabic-language networks, including a busi-
ness news channel in cooperation with CNBe and a documentary channel
along the lines of National Geographic or Discovery. The CNBC deal eventu-
ally went to a Dubai syndicate (Nair, 2003). In January 2003, A1-Ali repeated
the plan to establish an Ambic-language documentary channel by the end of
that year, along with opening bureaus in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur (Al-Famh,
2003). The channel has signed an agreement with the BBC to set up a training
centre, because AI-AIi appreciates the importance of training. To stay at the top,
he said, "we have to keep up with the latest in the technological and technical
fields and mise the efficiency of the technicians and employees".
Conclusion
Despite the number of pretenders, AI-Jazeera intends to stay at the top. It
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has the advantage of a good reputation among Arab viewers, the bene tit of
being the tirst 24-hour news and talk station in the Arab world, and dedicated
and well-trained staff. The major issue will be its ability to pay for itself and to
keep key people. Despite having a smaller staff budget compared with CNN
and BBC World, broadcasting remains an expensive business. Small staff num-
bers mean that reporters work long hours, and it may prove difficult to retain
staff long-term if they are tired, and if richer channels come by with cheque
books open.
Regardless of whether reviewers have been negative or positive, it is safe to
say AI-Jazeera has attracted great attention, putting tiny Qatar with its popula-
tion of perhaps 600,000 on the world map. And, while some critics object to the
"how" and the "what" that the station puts on air, those who work at AI-Jazeera
believe in their mission. "The journalist always makes a difference. From a
basic reporter up to the editor in chief, everyone makes a difference. We feel
that we are making a difference, especially in view of how the traditional Arab
media has been for the past four or five decades," said Ballou!. AI-Jazeera and
its staff, he believes, are a breath of fresh air. They are happy to be creating rip-
ples in the stagnant pond of Arabic broadcasting.
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